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that the federal courts were the best tribunals for the enforcement of civil rights
secured by the Constitution.35 Furthermore, in not providing for a minimum
jurisdictional amount,36 Congress evidently assumed every case involving in-
vasion of civil rights by state authorities to be sufficiently important to deserve
the attention of the federal courts. Allegations of unconstitutional action by
federal officers would seem to call for similar treatment.
The ever present danger is that behind the decision on the jurisdiction there
may lie a determination on the merits.37 Extension of Subsection 24(14) to
suits against federal officers not only would relieve the courts of an insoluble
problem of valuation, but would remove this temptation to decide hard cases
without giving the parties a hearing on the merits.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF ERIE RAIL-
ROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS. II*
EQUITY
The general proposition that federal courts should apply the doctrine of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins79 to reach the same result as would be reached by the
local state court must here be 'qualified by a few considerations peculiar to
equity. In the first place, it is not entirely clear that the Erie doctrine applies
to equity cases at all. The Rules of Decision Act provides that "the laws of the
several States .... shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law."1° In Neves v. Scotts, it was stated, without reference to the then nine-year-
3s Federal Courts-Jurisdiction over Violations of Civil Liberties by State Governments and
by Private Individuals, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 284 (1940).
36 The purpose of this pecuniary requirement is commonly said to be the prevention of
dogging of the federal judicial machinery with petty cases. i Hughes, Federal Practice 312
(1931). It has also been suggested that this provision prevents small litigants from setting in
motion machinery too expensive for their pocketbooks. But this theory does not seem con-
sistent with the strict application of the statute by the courts. The desire to permit the small
litigants to sue corporations without having his case drawn into the federal courts, certainly
was a factor in increasing the jurisdictional amount to $3,ooo. 46 Cong. Rec. 1074, 1075 (rgII).
37 See Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1907); cf. Federal Jurisdictional Amount
Requirement in Injunction Suits, 49 Yale L. J. 274, 283 (1939). It may be noted that several
cases to test the right'to WNPA jobs have been accepted by the federal district courts without
question of jurisdictional amount. Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243 (Cal. 1939); Block v. Sassa-
man, 26 F. Supp. io5 (Minn. 1939); Spang v. Roper, 13 F. Supp. 840 (Pa. 1936). But the dis-
trict courts, being able to determine jurisdiction on their own motion, 18 Stat. 472 (1875) as
amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 8o (1927), have no discretion in granting or denying jurisdiction. Wet-
more v. Rymer, z69 U.S. 115, 122 (1898).
* This is the final instalment of this note. Part I appears in 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 113 (1941).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8o Rev. Stat. § 721 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 725 (1928) (italics added).
81 13 How. (U.S.) *268 (i85i).
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old decision of Swift v. Tyson,82 that federal courts are independent of state de-
cisions in matters depending on the "principles of general equity jurisprudence."
If, then, the Erie case was merely a reinterpretation of the Rules of Decision
Act, overruling Swift v. Tyson, it should have had no effect on the law as applied
to suits in equity in the federal courts. If, however, the Erie case is a constitu-
tional interpretation,3 there is little room for doubt that it applies in equity.
Moreover, the principle of the Rules of Decision Act had long been recognized
by federal courts of equity in applying state statutes,8 4 in spite of statements to
the effect that the rule of decision in equity is the same in all courts of the United
States.1s
Since the Erie case, state decisions have been applied both by the Supreme
Court and by lower federal courts to numerous suits in equity. 6 Ruhlin v. New
York Life Ins. Co.,8 7 sometimes cited for the proposition that the Erie case is
applicable in equity, does not establish the principle as far as purely equitable
issues are concerned, since the particular question involved"8 might equally well
have arisen in a suit at law. But in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,89 the Court
held that state decisions must be applied to a purely equitable issue, the burden
82 r6 Pet. (U.S.) *r (1842).
8 This seems the more accurate interpretation of the decision. See Hart, The Business of
the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 6o6-ir (i94o).
84 Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923); Clark v. Smith, i3 Pet. (U.S.) *195,
*203 (1839).
85Neves v. Scott, 13 How. (U.S.) *268, *272 (1851); Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. (U.S.)
*648, *658 (1832).
86 State decisions have been applied in equity to both "legal" and "equitable" issues. Legal
issues: West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 U.S. 223 (194o); Texarkana v. Arkansas Louisi-
ana Gas Co., 3o6 U.S. 188 (939), same case on remand 118 F. (2d) 289 (C.C.A. 5th i94);
Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 112 F. (2d) 275 (C.C.A. 7 th 194o); Continental Illinois Nat'l
Bank v. Middlesboro, io9 F. (2d) 960 (C.C.A. 6th 194o); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Critz, io9
F. (2d) 417 (C.C.A. 5th 194o), cert. den. 309 U.S. 684 (x94o); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen,
io8 F. (2d) 632 (C.C.A. 6th i94o); Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., io3 F. (2d) 439 (C.C.A.
Ist 1939), cert. den. 308 U.S. 572 (I939); American Optometric Ass'n v. Ritholz, ioz F. (2d)
883 (C.C.A. 7 th i939), cert. den. 307 U.S. 657 (i939); Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, ioo F. (2d)
945 (C.C.A. ioth 1939); Toomey v. Toomey, 98 F. (2d) 736 (C.C.A. 7th 1938); St. Louis v.
Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 97 F. (2d) 726 (C.C.A. 8th 1938). Equitable issues: Cities Serv-
ice Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (i939); RFC v. Teter, 1I7 F. (2d) 716 (C.C.A. 7th x941);
General Petroleum Corp. v. Dougherty, 117 F. (2d) 529 (C.C.A. 9th 194); Prudential Ins.
Co. of America v. Land Estates, i1o F. (2d) 617 (C.C.A. 2d 194o); Fidelity & Guaranty Fire
Corp. v. Bilquist, io8 F. (2d) 713 (C.C.A. 9th i94o); Tulsa City Lines, Inc. v. Mains, 107 F.
(2d) 377 (C.C.A. ioth 1939); Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v. Special School District,
105 F. (2d) 7x6 (C.C.A. 8th 1939); Bruun v. Hanson, o3 F. (2d) 685 (C.C.A. 9 th x939), cert.
den. 3o8 U.S. 571 (x9 3 9 ); Pennsylvania MutualLife Ins. Co. v. Forcier, io3 F. (2d) i66 (C.C.A.
8th 1939), cert. den. 308 U.S. 571 (1939); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Catskill Nat'l
Bank, 102 F. (2d) 527 (C.C.A. 2d 1939); Asher v. Bone, xoo F. (2d) 35 (C.C.A. 9th z938).
87 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
8 8The construction of an insurance contract. 89 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
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of proof of bona fide purchase in a counterclaim to reform a conveyance. In
Russell v. Todd,90 however, the Court stated that "the Rules of Decision Act
does not apply to suits in equity.' In view of the fact that the Court proceeded
to decide that case on the basis of a state statute of limitations rather than on
the doctrine of laches, the statement may perhaps be taken simply as reiterating
that the act does not in terms include equity; but it does cast some doubt on the
whole question.
In the second place, there may, in equity, be greater reluctance to allow
state rules to control "procedural" matters with substantive aspects than is
found in actions at law,9' though under the Federal Rules the independence of
equity procedure is now no greater than that of law procedure.9 The reason is
largely historical. While the federal law courts for many years adapted their
procedure to state practice under the Conformity Act,93 that act never applied
to equity. Instead, it was provided that procedure in equity should be "accord-
ing to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity,"94 sub-
ject to rules of court, and this provision was taken to refer to the English chan-
cery practice.95
Again, there has been the limitation that state law may not change the line
of demarcation between law and equity in the federal courts;96 this limitation is
distinct from those rules, previously discussed,97 against allowing state law to
restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts as such. Since it prevented the ap-
plication of some state statutes in federal courts of equity prior to the Erie case,
it is probable that it will likewise restrict the applicability of state decisions.95
Much of the language in the opinions concerning the necessity for maintain-
ing this "uniformity of equity jurisdiction"99 stems from the hostility to equity
90 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940)-
91 See cases and discussion, Developments in the Doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Totnp-
kins. 1, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 125, 126 (I941); Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (N.Y.
x938).
9' The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 723c (1941), establishing one
form of action for both law and equity, are generally taken to have superseded the Conformity
Act, by which federal courts were required to follow state procedure in actions at law. Rev.
Stat. § 914 (875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 724 (1928). See Developments in the Doctrine of Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins. I, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1x3, 1i8 n. 30 (1941).
93 Rev. Stat. § 914 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 724 (1928).
94 Rev. Stat. § 913 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (1941).
9s Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. (U.S.) *648, *658 (1832); Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. (U.S.)
*632, *656 (1835).
96 See Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 557 (1923)-
97 Developments in the Doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. I, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
113, II5-17 (1941).
99 See Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 209 (1938): "Hitherto .... counsel
had to investigate the enactments of the state legislature. Now they must merely broaden
their inquiry to include the decisions of the state courts .......
99 Note 102 infra.
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practice in some of the states at the time of the formation of the Constitution.
At that time several states had no courts of equity; in Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, equitable doctrines were administered through common law forms, and
there were no equitable remedies.100 It was only after a struggle in Congress at
the time of the first judiciary Act that the federal courts were given chancery
powers in general terms without the serious restrictions that were advocated by
the representatives of the states opposed to equityx°I A federal district court
in a state without a court of equity would, if it followed the local practice, have
been allowing state law to restrict the powers won for it by this struggle in Con-
gress; for this reason it was early decided that the scope of cases heard in
equity in the federal courts should be uniform throughout the United States.02
Today, the more substantial reason for maintaining a certain uniformity in
federal equity jurisdiction is the requirement of the Seventh Amendment that
the right of trial by jury shall not be denied in suits at common law. State sys-
tems, not limited by this amendment, 0 3 may sometimes make triable in equity
matters which, at the time of the formation of the Constitution, were triable
only at law. The'extension of federal equity jurisdiction to include suits of this
type would, of course, prejudice the right to trial by jury.,04 This has been the
basic reason for many refusals to apply state statutes in federal courts of equity.
Thus a statute giving a simple contract creditor the right to have a receiver ap-
pointed for an insolvent corporation, °5 a statute allowing a creditor who has
not reduced his claim to judgment to sue to have a conveyance set aside as
fraudulent,"°6 and a statute permitting one out of possession to bring suit to
quiet title against one in possession,"°7 have been held to deprive a defendant of
his right to jury trial if applied in the federal equity court. But in a suit to
quiet title, both parties being out of possession, the state statute was applied in
the federal court, as the remedy of ejectment was not available."18
xo Fisher, The Administration of Equity through Common Law Forms in Pennsylvania,
2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 8io (i9o8).
x01 Von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75"U. of Pa. L. Rev. 287,
290 (1927).
"- Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) *212 (i818); Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. (U.S.)
*632 (1835); United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) *io8 (1819).
103 Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877).
104 For this reason it was provided by statute that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in
any court of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may
be had at law." Rev. Stat. § 723 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 384 (1928). It is clear that this pro-
vision has to do with drawing the line between an action at law and a suit in equity in the
federal court, since the legal remedy must be one available in the ?ederal, rather than the state
court. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, Vr6 (x898); Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. (U.S.)
*212, *222 (i818); see Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 569 (1939).
"'s Pusey & Jones Co. v. -anssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923).
zo6 Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451 (1893); Scott v. Neely, i4o U.S. 1o6 (i8gi).
"07 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (i89i).
08 Holland v. Challen, 11o U.S. i5 (1884); see Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146,
151-56 (189i).
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At the same time, state statutes not extending the jurisdiction of equity to
the prejudice of the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the framing
of the Constitution, but simply giving new "substantive rights," were frequent-
ly applied in federal courts of equity prior to the Erie case 0 9 Thus a state.
statute declaring that a deed void on its face constituted a cloud on title has
been applied in a suit to cancel the deed, though under the original chancery
practice such a suit would not lie.YI0 An Illinois statute giving the owner of the
equity of redemption twelve months after foreclosure of the mortgage in which
to redeem must be applied in the federal courts as a substantive right, in spite
of the procedural aspect."' A statute giving a right to have a usurious contract
canceled without offer to repay the loan has been applied,1" and a statute fixing
the damages to be recovered for conversion of mineral resources has been ap-
plied in a suit to recover the land."3
Although, in some respects, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be said
to "unite" law and equity,"14 the right to trial by jury is still a valid reason for
maintaining the distinction and refusing to allow state law to affect it; the en-
abling act"is and the Federal Rules ' 6 themselves provide that the right must be
preserved. The variations in state laws affecting the jurisdiction of equity,
which might disturb the uniform administration of the new one form of action
in the federal courts, still persist, especially in the varying adoption of codes of
practice uniting law and equity. Though a plaintiff is now expressly permitted
by Rule i8(b), for example, to "commingle law and equity" by stating a claim
for money and a claim to have a fraudulent conveyance set aside, this is a prod-
uct of the Federal Rules, not of any state law, and regardless of local practice
the right to trial by jury must be preserved in hearing the claim for money."7
Finally, there are the peculiarities arising from the long-established federal
rule that a plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit in equity must have been a
stockholder at the time of the alleged injury. This rule is contrary to that in
log See State Statutes and the Federal Equity Courts, 32 Col. L. Rev. 688 (1932).
"10 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 U.S. 369 (i914); Clark v.
Smith, 13 Pet. (U.S.) *195 (1839).
' Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U.S. 627 (1877).
11 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U.S. 351 (1899).
"13 Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923).
114 But cf. Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940) (case turned on question whether state
statute applied only to suits at law, or to equity as well). See dissent of Clark, J., in the same
case in the lower court, 1o4 F. (2d) i69, 175 (C.C.A. 2d 1939).
"'s48 Stat. io64 (1934), 28 US.C.A. § 723C (1941).
116 Rule 38(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723c (1941).
"17 It can hardly be thought that the Erie decision has changed the interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment so as to allow state law to determine when the right to trial by jury
exists in the federal courts.
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many states,"' and is now a part of Rule 23 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure."9 While the desirability of the federal rule has been much questioned,
especially when put in the form of a procedural rule,120 there was, of course, be-
fore the Erie case, usually no argument for applying the state rules, since they
were expressed in state decisions."21 Since the Erie case, however, the problem
arises whether state decisions to the contrary should be applied in a federal
court. If Rule 23 (b) is for the purpose of preventing collusion in obtaining fed-
eral jurisdiction"' or equity jurisdiction,123 a refusal to follow state law is justi-
fied;"4 but if the rule is a substantive principle of equity, it seems that under
the analysis presented herein the state law should control.1 5
The rule operates harshly as a safeguard to federal equity jurisdiction; for if
this is its ground, it amounts to a conclusive presumption that there is collusion
118 x3 Fletcher, Corporations §§ 598o-8i (perm. ed. 1932), lists Alabama, California, Idaho,
Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and EnglAnd
as applying the "majority rule" that a subsequent stockholder may recover; Colorado, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington as applying
the "federal and minority rule."
"19 The rule first appeared as a dictum in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (i881); it
shortly became Rule 94 of the Equity Rules of 1882, then Rule 27 of the Equity Rules of 1912.
120 x Foster, Federal Practice 8o (6th ed. 1920); Seasongood, Rightuof a Stockholder Suing
on Behalf of a Corporation to Complain of Misdeeds Occurring Prior to His Acquisition of
Stock, 21 Harv. L. Rev. i95 (I908).
2t But d. Hand v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 55 F. (2d) 712 (D.C.N.Y. 1931), in which
the court referred to a New York statute, but perhaps for another purpose. In the later case
of Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (N.Y. 1938), however, the federal court in New York
makes no reference to state statutes.
r22 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (i88i). The fear was that a corporation, not being able
to sue its true opponent in the federal court because of lack of diversity of citizenship, would
get a stockholder from another state to sue it and the true opponent in a stockholder's suit in
the federal court.
13 Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887). If the corporation's right against the true opponent
is one triable at law, the true opponent is, in a stockholder's suit, deprived of his right to trial
by jury.
124 From this aspect Rule 23 (b) resembles the restriction that "no district court shall have
cognizance of any suit .... to recover on any promissory note or other chose in action in favor
of any assignee .... unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover
upon said note or other chose in action if no assignment had been made." Rev. Stat. § 629
(1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1) (1927). Rule 23 (b) is not restricted in its operation, however,
to cases in which the plaintiff's predecessor in ownership could not have sued in the federal
district court.
12S 2 Moore, Federal Practice § 23.05, at 2253 (1938); "Substance" and "Procedure" in
Federal Equity-The Labor Injunction and the Stockholder's Suit, 4i Col. L. Rev. 1o4, 115-21
(1941). Apart from the jurisdictional aspect, it is hard to see how Rule 23 (b) can be "procedu-
raP' under any criterion. See Developments in the Doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. I,
9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 118-27 (1941). The Rule is somewhat like Rule 17(a), which re-
quires that the plaintiff be the "real party in interest;" but if under some collusive arrangement
the plaintiff is suing on behalf of a stockholder who did not himself have a right to sue in the
federal court, Rule 17(a) itself applies-the situation is not peculiar to stockholders' suits.
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between the plaintiff and the corporation simply on a showing of subsequent
transfer of the stock. Such an ironclad safeguard seems unnecessary, since the
plaintiff must aver in his complaint, verified by oath, that the action is not col-
lusive to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States,26 and must show
his demands on the corporation.' 27 Thus the court can ascertain whether or not
there is collusion and will dismiss the complaint if there is.121
Moreover, it would seem that if the rule is really jurisdictional, dismissal
should be without prejudice, or, if the suit had been removed from a state
court, it should be remanded. But in at least one case the Supreme Court has
held that it was proper to dismiss the suit rather than remand it to the state
court, saying that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the rule did not deprive
the federal court of jurisdiction.129 Though the point has never been decided, it
seems that the dismissal, being for want of equity rather than want of juris-
diction, was res judicata.130 But the fact that the rule has in some instances not
been applied to cases coming before the federal courts on a federal question-3'
does indicate that the rule is to protect the diversity jurisdiction, collusion to
obtain diversity of citizenship being irrelevant if there are other grounds of
federal jurisdiction. 32
126 Rule 23(b)(2).
127 Rule 23(b)(3). A stockholder must, of course, exhaust every remedy within the corpora-
tion before bringing a derivative suit. Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (2887); Long v. Stites,
88 F. (2d) 554 (C.C.A. 6th '937), cert. den. 3oi U.S. 706 (1937); 2 Moore, Federal Practice
§ 23.05, at 2265 et seq. (1938).
128 36 Stat. 1o98 (i9i), 28 U.S.C.A. § 80 (1927).
129 Venner v. Great Northern R. Co., 209 U.S. 24 (i9o8). Cf. Cates v. Allen, i4g U.S. 451
(893) (where federal court of equity could not entertain claim for money joined with claim
to set aside fraudulent conveyance, suit remanded to state court, in which such a proceeding in
equity was allowed).
130 Cf. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Compania Transatlantica Espafiola, 134 N.Y.
461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892) (same effect to be given to judgment in federal court as to judgment in
state court, though plaintiff would not have recovered in state court); Crescent City Live Stock
Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse Co., 120 U.S. 141 (1887) (disregard of federal judgment
in state court presents federal question). In Venner's later derivative suit against the Great
Northern and James J. Hill, Venner v. Great Northern R. Co., 117 Minn. 447, 136 N.W. 271
(1912), Vener made no claims for the wrongs alleged in the previous federal suit. Possibly,
however, the statute of limitations had run, or a settlement of the previous claims had been
made. See 2 Moore, Federal Practice § 22.o5, at 2251 n. 12 (1938), and Sears, The New Place
of the Stockholder gg (1929), for a characterization of Venner as a well-known strike-suitor.
This, however, far from being collusion, is champerty, a matter of substantive public policy.
13,Hand v. Kansas CitySouthern R. Co., 55 F.(2d) 712 (D.C.N.Y. I931); Lindsleyv. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 162 Fed. 954 (C.C.N.Y. zgo8), demurrer sustained 17o Fed. 1023 (C.C.N.Y.
igog), aff'd 220 U.S. 6i (1gi1) (in this case the directors were actually sympathetic with the
plaintiff). Contra: Whittemore v. Amoskeag Nat'l Bank, 26 Fed. 89 (C.C.N.H. 1885), rev'd
on other grounds 134 U.S. 527 (1890). It seems that this treatment is peculiar to the Southern
District of New York. See Jacobson v. General Motors Corp., 22 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.Y. 1938).
132 Even though there is a federal question to support federal jurisdiction, there might still
be collusion to obtain equity jurisdiction. In the cases cited note x31 supra, however, the claims
asserted were all equitable, so this additional complication did not arise.
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The fact that several states have adopted the rule'33 indicates that it does
not depend entirely on the protection of federal jurisdiction, or even of equity
jurisdiction, since the states are not bound by the Seventh Amendment. One
decision was clearly based on a policy against champerty; 3 4 another decision
stated that the rule had nothing to do with the peculiarities of federal jurisdic-
tion13s
Since the Erie case, lower federal courts have followed the rule, though with
some doubt, despite conflict with local decisions,3S except in a case where juris-
diction was based on a federal question.3 7 One court, however, was in great
doubt about the matter."38 This court felt that the Erie decision makes local
decisions as well as local statutes affecting the substantive rights of suitors ap-
plicable in a federal cofrt of equity; but because the requirement was embodied
in a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court, it held that it was not for a dis-
trict court to put it aside.139
THE FEDERAL FIELD
The Erie rule covers only those cases where formerly the federal courts, un-
der the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, used their own judgment on matters of so-called
general law; in cases where the Constitution and laws of the United States ap-
ply, state law controls only in so far as the federal law leaves room for it. Nor
need one point to an express provision in a federal statute in order to prevent
the application of state law. In a limited group of cases, the mere fact that
there has been some federal regulation of the matter is said to have brought the
33 Note r8 supra. See, for example, Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W.
1024 (1903) (no right in plaintiff); Boldenweck v. Bullis, 4o Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907)
(champerty); Neff v. Gas & Electric Shop, 232 Ky. 66, 22 S.W. (2d) 265 (1929) (no right in
plaintiff).
134 Boldenweck v. Bulls, 40 Colo. 253, go Pac. 634 (1907). Cf. Dimpfell v. Ohio & Missis-
sippi R. Co., 110 U.S. 209, 210 (1884).
X35 Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. io24 (1903); cf. Lissauer v. Bertles,
37 F. Supp. 88i (N.Y. i94o); see Illinois Central R. Co. v. Adams, iSo U.S. 28, 34 (i9oi):
..... the defence set up under the Nimety-fourth rule does not raise a question of jurisdiction,
but of the authority of the plaintiff to maintain this bill."
136 Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. ioo6 (N.Y. i94i), aff'd 12o F. (2d) 328 (C.C.A. 2d
1941); Lissauer v. Bertles, 37 F. Supp. 88x (N.Y. i94o); Robbins v. Sperry Corp., I Fed. Rules
Dec. 220 (N.Y. 194o); Bachrach v. General Investment Corp., 29 F. Supp. 966 (N.Y. 1939);
Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (N.Y. I938).
X37 Jablow v. Agnew, 3o F. Supp. 718 (N.Y. 1946). The court recognized an "apparent
anomaly" between the treatment of a case removed on grounds of a federal question and the
treatment of a case removed on grounds of diversity. The anomaly is more clearly put in
Jacobson v. General Motors Corp., 22 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.Y. i938).
1s Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (N.Y. z938); cf. Gallup v. Caldwell, 12o F. (2d) go
(C.C.A. 3d x94x).
139 For discussion of those Federal Rules with substantive aspects, see Developments in
the Doctrine of Eric Railroad Co. v. Tomphins. I, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 113, 121-27 (I94I).
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matter within the "federal field," thus preventing the application of state law.140
This federal field doctrine in no way detracts from the validity of the proposi-
tion that under the Erie case the federal court should reach the same result as
would the local state court, since the state courts must also apply the federal
law in the federal field.'4' The doctrine does, however, present a possibility of
cutting down the effect of the Erie case.
It is not likely that the doctrine will be used to restrict the effect of the Erie
case to any great extent, however. In only two types of cases-those dealing
with transactions of interstate railroad carriers and of interstate telegraph com-
panies-has it received any general application. Even in these situations, it has
been applied only to those aspects of the business fairly close to the federal
regulation. Thus, under the doctrine, state law nullifying the limitation of lia-
bility in bills of lading,'42 on free passes,' 43 or on telegraph messages'44 has been
refused effect. Likewise, what constitutes compensable harm for failure or mis-
take in delivering an interstate message 45 or shipment,146 and the privilege of a
telegraph company in sending a libelous interstate message,47 are matters with-
140 E.g., O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. (2d) 539 (C.C.A. rst i94o); Vaigneur v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (Tenn. 1940), noted in 41 Col. L. Rev. 125 (194i);
Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 112 F. (2d) 959 (C.C.A. 5th i94o), noted in 8 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 143 (i94o), rev'd on other grounds 312 U.S. 630 (1941) (semble); see The Applicability
of Federal Rules of Decision in State Courts in Suits for Injuries to Interstate Rail Passengers,
3o Ill. L. Rev. 373 (1935).
X41 Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (I915) (in action under Federal Employ-
er's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (199o), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1928), state court must apply federal
rule as to burden of Rroof even though that rule is nowhere mentioned in the statute); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 25r U.S. 315 (1920):
142 Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936); Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (i913); cf. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S.
209 (i93i) (limitation of time within which claim must be made. The federal statute occupy-
ing the field is the Carmack Amendment, 34 Stat. 593 (1907) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11)
(1929), governing liability on bills of lading in interstate shipments.
143 Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S. 459 (1923). The Hepburn Act, 34
Stat. 584 (19075, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(7) (1929), designates the classes of persons who may receive
free passes, but makes no provision as to the liability of the railroad to them.
X44 Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber (o., 251 U.S. 27 (1919). The
field was occupied by the Igio amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 36 Stat. 544
(1911), 49 U.S.C.A. § i (1929), extending the act to telegraph companies; classification of mes-
sages was there provided for, but limitation of liability was not mentioned.
X4s Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920) (state statute fixing penalty for
failure to deliver telegram promptly may not be applied by state court in a case involving an
interstate telegram); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920) (state court may
not allow damages for mental anguish for failure to transmit interstate telegram accurately).
146 Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (i915) (state court may not award damages
for mental anguish for failure to deliver promptly, especially in view of limitation of liability
in bill of lading).
'47 O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. (2d) 539 (C.C.A. ist 194o). The court de-
duced the privilege from § 202(a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1070
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in the federal field. But matters having to do, not with the way in which inter-
state railroads or telegraph companies conduct their business, but rather with
their liability for injuries due to negligence of their servants, are governed by
state law. Thus.questions relating to the liability of a railroad for personal in-
jury due to its negligence,148 or of a telegra:ph company for an assault by its
special agent,149 are governed by state law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's way of dealing with the doctrine in the re-
cent case of Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co. 50 perhaps indicates that the whole
doctrine is in disfavor. In that case, the circuit court of appeals held that wheth-
er the rights of a railway laborer were governed by the union's written contract
with the company or by the laborer's oral contract with the company was a
federal field matter, and that the oral contract, with the shorter statute of limi-
tations, was controlling.'s The Court, in reversing the decision, made no men-
tion of the federal field doctrine, but simply held that, since the state statute of
limitations was in any event controlling, the state court's application of that
statute in the same case must control.1S2 At any rate, the failure of the Court
even to mention the federal field doctrine may indicate that the question is still
open.
From other points of view, however, there are indications that the doctrine
may be given a more extended application. There are certainly other federal
statutes, such as the Civil Aeronautics Act' and the Motor Carriers Act,"54 by
(1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (Supp. i941), providing that no common carrier shall make un-
reasonable discriminations, and §§ 2o6 and 207, providing for liability in case of violation.
'48 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3o4 U.S. 64 (1938).
r49 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. White, I04 F. (2d) 923 (C.C.A. 9th 1939). The court held that
the company was liable for punitive damages, though there was no express authorization or
ratification of the servants' acts, with no mention of whether there was any federal statute
affecting the question. But cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Aldridge, 66 F. (2d) 26 (C.C.A. 9th
1933), in which the court held, on the grounds both of "general law" and the federal field, that,
irrespective of state law, punitive damages could not be awarded for disclosure of the contents
of a telegram by an employee, in the absence of authorization or ratification. See 89 A.L.R. 356
(i934), annotating telegraph company's liability for punitive damages; federal field not con-
sidered.
150 312 U.S. 630 (194i).
5 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Moore, 112 F. (2d) 959 (C.C.A. 5 th 194o). The Railway Labor
Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1927) as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 (Supp. 1941), providing for collective
agreements, was held to have occupied the field.
'52 On a previous appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi before the case was removed
to the federal court on amended pleadings, that court had held that the longer statute of limi-
tations applied, the suit being based on the written contract. Since this decision was one of
reversal and remand, and not a final adjudication, the federal court was not bound by it as the
law of the case. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 3o6 U.S. 1o3 (x939).
'53 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 4ox (Supp. x94i).
154 49 Stat. 543 (1936), 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 (Supp. 1941). Of course there are many other
federal regulations which could be likewise extended, but these acts are mentioned as being
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which Congress appears to have taken over the fields affected by the acts to
much the same extent as it has done through its legislation regarding railroads
and telegraph companies. Moreover, there is some tendency toward considering
matters relating to contracts with the Federal Government as being in the feder-
al field, even though not specifically covered by legislation55-a matter which
could become of considerable importance in view of the rapidly increasing num-
ber of Federal Government contracts. Finally, in Jackson County v. United
States, s6 a suit to recover taxes illegally collected from an Indian ward of the
Government, the Court held that the state law did not control as to the right
to recover interest prior to judgment on the taxes withheld.157 Since the Indian
was immune from taxation by virtue of the treaty with her tribe,10 the matter
was held to be "ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States.'"s9
most like those which have been the basis of the previous federal field cases. However, the
Court has recently indicated that even these statutes will not be broadly construed so as to
exclude state law. In Maurer v. Hamilton, 3o9 U.S. 598, 614 (I94O), holding that a state statute
regulating an interstate motor carrier was not superseded by regulations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Court said, "Congressional intention to displace local laws in the
exercise of the commerce power is not, in general, to be inferred unless clearlyindicated ..... This
is especially the case when public safety and health are concerned." Cf. Townsend v. Yeomans,
301 U.S. 441 (1937) (Tobacco Inspection Act does not exclude state statute fixing charges for
handling and selling tobacco). While these cases involve state regulatory statutes, it is to be
expected that under the Erie decision the same treatment will be accorded state decisions ac-
complishing similar objectives.
X55 Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (i94i) (state law does not control
as to the award of interest as damages for "delayed payment of a contractual obligation to the
United States"); Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (Cal. 194o) (state law
invalidating liquidated damages clause does not apply ih suit against United States under the
Tucker Act), noted in 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1070 (194); see Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp.
972, 973 (Md. 94). Contra: United States v. Brookridge Farm, iii F. (2d) 461 (C.C.A.
ioth I94O) (whether government hospital had broken contract to buy milk and effect of sec-
ond contract, governed by state law); Keifer & Kelfer v. RFC, 97 F. (2d) 812 (C.C.A. 8th
1938), rev'd on other grounds 306 U.S. 381 (1939) (state law that bailee cannot exempt himself
from liability for negligence must be applied, though bailee is government corporation); d.
Carr v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 236 (Ky. 1939) (state law that loss of farm profits is too
speculative an element of damages controls in suit against government to recover damages for
land taken).
1s6 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
's However, in both this case and in Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289
(194r), note 153 supra, the same rule as that followed by the local court was in fact applied.
But cf. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200 (1940) (state law immaterial when illegality of
note is a "legal consequence" of federal statute).
X58 12 Stat. 1191 (1863).
'59 There is also the possibility of applying the federal field doctrine even where there is
no legislation at all, simply because a matter is one on which Congress might legislate under
the Constitution. See Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1927). The
present Court's approach to questions involving the applicability of state statutes in which
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SOURCES OF STATE LAW
Where there is a direct holding on the point by the state court of last resort,
the federal court, of course, has no problem in reaching ihe same result as would
have been reached by the state court.'6° In the absence of such a holding, how-
ever, the result which would probably be reached by the state court is not so
clear. Nevertheless, "state law," for this purpose, is not limited to that found
in direct holdings. The Supreme Court has held that, in cases "balanced with
doubt," a federal court must follow a considered dictum of the highest court of
the state. 6 This course has been followed by the lower federal courts, both in
accepting dicta of the state court 62 and in drawing inferences from state de-
cisions not directly in point.6 3
Where the only decisions are those of intermediate appellate courts of the
state, not binding on the state supreme court or on other intermediate appellate
courts, even less indication of the probable result of the litigation in a state
Congress might have legislated does not indicate, however, that this will be made the basis
of any general doctrine. Compare Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), same case in lower
court, The Friendship II, 113 F. (2d) xo5 (C.C.A. 5th i94o), noted in 40 Col. L. Rev. 1434
(i94o) (state statute creating survival of tort liability of decedent applied in an action in
admiralty), with Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (emphasizing the need
for uniformity of law in admiralty). See also Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S.
466 (1939) (employee of federal agency has no implied immunity from state income tax).
x6o There is always the possibility, however, that the state court might overrule its previous
direct holdings. The federal court must consider this possibility, but it must follow closely the
indications given by the state court. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 503
(1939); Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941); cf. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941), note 186 infra.
161 Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (i933).
16 In re Pointer Brewing Co., io5 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th 1939). But see New England
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 118 F. (2d) 414, 419 (C.C.A. 4 th i94i). In Transbel In-
vestment Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396 (N.Y. I94O), the court went so far as to follow a dictum
which had been repeated for a hundred years, but distinguished by the state court in every
case in which the question seemed to be presented.
z63 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F. (2d) 584 (C.C.A. 9 th 194);
Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 115 F. (2d) 277 (C.C.A. 4 th
i94o), cert. den. 312 U.S. 702 (1941); American Life Ins. Co. v. Hutcheson, io9 F. (2d) 424
(C.C.A. 6th 594o), cert. den. 310 U.S. 625 (594o); Jensen v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 98 F.
(2d) 469 (C.C.A. 9th 1938), cert. den. 307 U.S. 622 (r939) (the court, sitting in California,
consulted a Massachusetts case which had been cited with approval by the California court).
In American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Belch, ioo F. (2d) 48 (C.C.A. 4 th 1938), the court was convinced
by another Virginia decision called to its attention on rehearing that the Virginia court fol-
lowed a theory of interpretation of the phrase "accidental death" different from that adopted
by the Supreme Court, and so reversed itself on the rehearing. See also Yoder v. Nu-Enamel
Corp., I17 F. (2d) 488, 489 (C.C.A. 8th 1941): "Any convincing manifestation of local law,
having a clear root in judicial conscience and responsibility, whether resting in direct exlires-
sion or obvious implication and inference, should accordingly be given appropriate heed."
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court is given. 64 Furthermore, a federal court might feel unduly subordinated
if compelled to follo~v such decisions. Nevertheless, they are an indication of
the state law on the subject, and the Supreme Court has recently held that they
must be followed.'6 5 It has even been intimated that the decision of a nisi prius
court might control;' 66 and in Fidelity Union Trust Ca. v. Field,67 two decisions
of the New Jersey Court of Chancery, a court of first instance, were held con-
trolling. However, the New Jersey Court of Chancery has state-wide jurisdic-
tion and is generally of greater importance than an ordinary nisi prius court.,6
If there are no applicable or clear state decisions, or if the parties do not con-
tend for state law and there is no indication of state law to the contrary, 69 many
federal courts have felt free to follow federal and general decisions, or to use
their own judgment.7 Academically, of course, in such a situation the surest
way of finding what result the state court would reach would be to send the
case over to the state court; strange as it may seem, that device has actually
been employed. In Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,17' a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, the question arose as t9 whether the trustee had the fee simple title to
certain oil lands. The Supreme Court held that, since there was no clear state
decision on the point, the trustee should institute suit in the Illinois state court
164 Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 9 F. (2d) 536, 537 (C.C.A. 2d 1925), rev'd on other grounds-
1o F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 2d 1926).
x65 West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (i94o); Six Companies v. Joint Highway
District, 3ii U.S. i8o (r94o); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (i94o); cf. Blair
v. Comr, 3o U.S. 5 (1937); Erie R. Co. v. Hilt, 247 U.S. 97 (1918).
'6 Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 207-8 (1938). But see Jennings & Co. v.
Maestri, 97 F. (2d) 679, 682 (C.C.A. 5th 1938); Buder v. New York Trust Co., 107 F. (2d) 705
(C.C.A. 2d 1939), cert. den. 309 U.S. 677 (1940).
167311 U.S. i69 (i94o).
166 In re Appointment of Vice Chancellors, ioS N.J. Eq. 759, r48 AtI. 570 (193o); Penn-
sylvania R. Co. v. Nat'l Docks R. Co., 54 N.J. Eq. 647, 35 At. 433 (1896).
169 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 11i, 113 n. 1 (1938): "Most of the issues
in the case involve questions of common law, and hence are within the scope of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But no claim has been made that the local law is any different
from the general law on the subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal
precedents."
170 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 13 F. (2d) 8o6 (C.C.A. 2d 194o), cert. den. 311 U.S. 711
(i94o); De Long v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., io 9 F. (2d) 585 (C.C.A. 5th i94o), cert.
den. 310 U.S. 635 (i94o); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 103 F. (2d) 839 (C.C.A. 3 d 1939);
Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., io3 F. (2d) 439 (C.C.A. Ist 1939), cert. den. 308 U.S. 572
(1939); Paddleford v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., zoo F. (2d) 6o6 (C.C.A. 7 th 1938), cert. den.
3o6 U.S. 664 (1939); Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 99 F. (2d) 614
(C.C.A. 9th 1938); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Plymouth Box & Panel Co., 99 F. (2d) 218
(C.C.A. 4 th 1938); Toomey v. Toomey, 98 F. (2d) 736 (C.C.A. 7th 1938); Fireman's Fund
Indemnity Co. v. Kennedy, 97 F. (2d) 882 (C.C.A. 9th 1938).
71 309 U.S. 478 (i94o), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 727 (1940). See also The Pullma.
Case: ALimitationon the Business of the Federal Courts, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1388 (i94i).
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to determine the point."72 Since then, the federal courts, without mention of the
Magnolia case, have continued to search for state law in dicta,273 in inferences
from other decisions,14 and in lower state court cases, 7 s and in the absence of
state court decisions have followed federal decisions or their own judgment.,76
The Supreme Court has recently indicated, however, that the Magnolia deci-
sion has not been forgotten. 77
One instance which might prove an exception to the general rule that a fed-
eral court should reach the same result as a state court would have reached may
arise in cases concerning the effect to be given state decisions overruling pre-
vious decisions. In Gelpcke v. Dubuque,"75 decided eighty years ago, it was held
172 Some of the difficulties of such a proceeding are illustrated by Ohio Oil Co. v. Thompson,
12o F. (2d) 831 (C.C.A. 8th 1941). The question arose as to whether the state court should also
consider counterclaims of the oil company against the trustee. On petition of the trustee, the
federal district court prohibited the oil companies from bringing such counterclaims in the state
proceedings; the circuit court of appeals held that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review the district court's construction of the Supreme Court's mandate.
"7 Transbel Investment Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396 (N.Y. i94o).
174 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, Inc. v. Olvera, iig F. (2d) 584 (C.C.A. 9th 1941);
Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 1I5 F. (2d) 277 (C.C.A. 4th
i94o), cert. den. 312 U.S. 702 (1941); see Yoder v..Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F. (2d) 488, 489
(C.C.A. 8th 1941), quoted note i63 supra.
'7$ Cases cited notes 165, 167 supra.
176 Carter Oil Co. v. Welker, 112 F. (2d) 299 (C.C.A. 7th 1939), rehearing den. June ig,
i94o (three months after the Magiiolia decision), cert. granted 311 U.S. 633 (I94O) (closely
resembles the Magnolia case, except that the administration of the bankruptcy jurisdiction was
involved in the latter case; see note 177 infra); Gallup v. Caldwell, 12o F. (2d) go (C.C.A.
3d 194); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., i13 F. (2d) 8o6 (C.C.A. 3d i94o), cert. den. 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
'77 Railroad Com'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (where no decision of state court
indicating whether action of state commission was within its statutory power, case must be
sent to the state court for determination of that point, before Supreme Court will consider the
constitutionality of the action of the commission). See The Pullman Case: A Limitation on
the Business of the Federal Courts, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379 (I941). The Pullman case has since
been followed in Green v. Phillips Petroleum Co., g F. (2d) 466 (C.C.A. 8th 194), cert. den.
62 S.Ct. 72 (1941).
It may be significant that in both the Magnolia and the Pullman cases federal courts of
special powers were involved; in the Magnolia case the bankruptcy court retained control
through the trustee and his possession of the property, while in the Pullman case the court
alluded to the discretionary powers of a court of equity. The doctrine of forum non conireniens,
however, might serve much the same purpose in a federal court of law. See The Pullman Case:
A Limitation on the Business of the Federal Courts, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1389 (1941). It
may also be significant that both cases involved peculiarly local problems, one a question of
real property law, the other the statutory powers of a state regulatory commission. Cf. Gilchrist
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929), commented on in Frankfurter and
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 61
(1929).
178' Wall. (U.S.) 175 (1863).
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that such decisions should not be applied to cases in which contracts had been
entered into or property rights acquired in reliance on the law as established by
the preceding decisions.79 The doctrine was later extended to apply to cases in
which, at the time the "rights of the parties accrued," the law of the state on the
point in question was not settled, though prior to suit in the federal court an
otherwise applicable state decision had been handed down.18°
There seems, however, to be little vitality left in the doctrine of the Gelpcke
case. The Supreme Court, being unwilling to say that the Constitution pre-
vented state courts from applying their overruling decisions retroactively,
'sr
could not on appeal from the state courts compel them to follow the federal
rule, and, serious conflicts developed.182 In recent decisions there has been a
tendency to forget the doctrine.
In Marine Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Co.,183 a decision by the Wisconsin court
construing the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act adopted by that state was
held to control the case, although the Wisconsin decision was made after the
pledge in question and was probably in conflict with the weight of authority. 84
Likewise, the Court has held that state decisions interpreting other state statutes
in what seems to have been an entirely unexpected manner after action by the
parties to the case at hand must be given effect by federal courts.85s And it has
179 See Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 311 (i89r); Rand, Swift v.
Tysoan versus Gdpcke v. Dubuque, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 328 (I895); How Far Do State Decisions
Determine "LocalLaw" for the Federal Courts?, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 310 (1926). In McClure v.
Owen, 26 Iowa 243, 250-53 (i868), the series of Iowa decisions leading up to the Gelpcke case
is reviewed, and suspicious circumstances are hinted at in connection with the original decision
the overruling of which by the Iowa court resulted in the conflict over the Gelpcke case.
180 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (igio); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.
Jones, 193 U.S. 532 (1904).
181 Railroad Co. v. McClure, io Wall. (U.S.) 5I1 (1870); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S.
444 (1924); cf. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932)
(state court's action in applying previous decisions to present case, but stating that for the fu-
ture they were overruled, held constitutional).
5 8 Local officials found themselves subject to directly contradictory state court injunc-
tions and federal court mandamus. Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 65 (1867);
Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 575 (i869). Moreover, bitter feelings arose between state
and federal courts over this conflict. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. (U.S.) 75, 2o6 (1863): "We
shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has erected the altar
and decreed the sacrifice." Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88, i68 (1869): "Woe is the day when
one court will aid, nay originate an attack on the integrity and public virtue of another
court ..... ;
13 293 U.S. 357 (1934)-
X84 Marine Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Co., 7o F. (2d) 8iS (C.C.A. 7th X934) (same case in the
lower court). In reversing the decision, the Supreme Court did not disagree with this conclu-
sion of the lower court.
xss Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (194o); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52
(13)
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recently been held that if, after a federal district court has decided a case in ac-
cordance with a long line of decisions of the state court, the state court over-
rules its previous decisions while the federal case is pending on appeal, the new
state decision must be followed by the appellate court. 86 In these cases, it is
true, the circumstances were not such that the objection against retroactivity
was so strong as it was in Gelpcke v. Dubuque; nevertheless, they do indicate a
trend away from the doctrine of the Gelpcke case. It has been suggested that,
under the Erie case, the question as to how an overruling decision should be ap-
plied in a later case is itself a matter of substantive law, 8 7 as to which the state
law should control. 88
x86 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941), same case in lower court
noted in 5o Yale L. J. 315 (194o); City Co. of New York, Inc. v. Stem, 312 U.S. 666 (i94i).
These cases may be compared with the earlier case of Burgess v. Seligman, x07 U.S. 20 (i882)
(Supreme Court not bound to reverse circuit court on the basis of a supervening decision of
state court).
187 See Long, A Warning Signal for Municipal Bondholders: Some Implications of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 589 (z939), raising doubt as to the validity of Gelpcke
v. Dubuque since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.
lag See Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), note
xSi supra, for a case in which the state court did not apply its overruling decision retroactively.
